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Introduction 
 
 
International Climate Policy Leadership 
after COP23 
The EU Must Resume Its Leading Role, But Cannot Do So Alone 
Susanne Dröge and Vijeta Rattani 
The net outcome of the Bonn climate talks (23rd Conference of the Parties, COP23) in 
November was lukewarm at best. Many technical issues were brought forward and the 
political risks caused by the US announcement to pull out of the Paris Agreement were 
kept at bay. Yet, leadership to fill the void left by the US was lacking. Germany, who was 
co-hosting with the Fiji Islands, could not table ambitious solutions as in November 
2017 it only had a caretaker government in place. The Fiji Presidency brought attention 
to adaptation, agriculture, finance and the loss and damage debates, but could not suc-
ceed to the full extent, mainly due to conflicts on finance. The performance by China 
was disappointing as it did not follow up on its ambitions to lead. With a view to 
2018, the EU once again claimed a leadership role on the international climate agenda, 
though not unilaterally. During the Bonn UNFCCC negotiations, however, the EU dis-
appointed many of its partners as it did not deliver as a constructive negotiator and 
bridge builder. Rather, it pushed for some of the technical issues. Given the urgency to 
forge a rulebook for the Paris Agreement implementation and in light of progressing 
climate change, the EU and its Member States need to demonstrate instrumental and 
directional leadership in the run-up to the next COP in Katowice, Poland in 2018. 
 
The COP23 was the first climate summit 
held under a small island Presidency. The 
Fiji Islands belong to the group of vulnera-
ble and poor countries that are already 
affected by climate change today. It was 
expected that Fiji’s Presidency would add 
impetus to the negotiations given that 2017 
was a year pronounced as the warmest non-
El Niño year in history and marked by 
severe extreme weather events around the 
globe. In particular, progress on issues like 
adaptation, finance and the loss and damage 
caused by climate change impacts was a pri-
ority for the Fiji Islands. In order to enable 
the COP23, the German government hosted 
the event in Bonn at the UNFCCC secretari-
at. This double hosting by an industrialised 
and a vulnerable country was unique. 
A technical meeting 
The Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015 
and ratified by 170 countries (as of Novem-
ber 2017). A key target of the Bonn COP was 
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to draft a rulebook on how the Paris Agree-
ment should be implemented. As per the 
mandate, this rulebook is set to be com-
pleted by 2018 at the 24th COP. Thus, pro-
gress was needed in Bonn on technical 
issues including the measuring and ac-
counting of greenhouse gas emissions, 
transparency, regular review of measures 
taken (global stocktake), market mecha-
nisms and on the regular agenda items 
such as adaptation, loss and damage, agri-
culture and finance. For the EU and Ger-
many, it was a clear priority to have a text 
draft on the rulebook ready to ensure that 
it can be finished in 2018. To this end, there 
was only limited progress in Bonn and the 
final decision text of COP23 recognizes the 
need for an extra negotiating session next 
year before the COP24. 
Talanoa Dialogue 
One major achievement of the COP23 was 
the launch of the Talanoa Dialogue (named 
after a Fijian tradition for open and in-
clusive exchange) which would start in 
January 2018. The aim is to collect as much 
information as possible about the current 
state of the nationally determined contri-
butions (NDCs) – climate policy targets 
announced by each party to the Paris Agree-
ment up to 2017 – and to recognize gaps for 
raising ambitions ahead of the next round 
of NDCs in 2020. This dialogue will, there-
fore, mostly focus on climate ambitions up 
to 2020. As commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol’s second commitment period, 
ending in 2020, will not suffice to lower 
emissions quickly enough, enhanced efforts 
are in fact a precondition of achieving the 
Paris Agreement’s global average tempera-
ture target of a global warming “well below 
2 degrees Celsius” (Article 2 PA) and strive 
for 1.5 degrees Celsius by the end of this 
century. The earlier the investments in 
mitigation are raised, the more likely it is 
for policymakers to deliver on the long-
term targets. 
The dialogue was suggested back in 2015 
and called the Facilitative Dialogue. Non-party 
stakeholders from civil society and sub-
national governments will also provide it 
with information, which is a new concept. 
The Talanoa Dialogue is a test run for regular 
reviews of national climate policies in light 
of the two-degree target, planned from 
2023 onwards (global stocktake). Another 
review process is planned for 2019 on finan-
cial and technological support for reaching 
climate targets (Articles 9 and 10 PA). 
Finance 
The financial commitments and transpar-
ency of financial flows under the Paris 
Agreement were once more at the centre 
of attention in Bonn. Parties to the Paris 
Agreement had agreed that climate finance 
should reach 100 billion USD by 2020. For 
this, more commitments are needed. Pro-
jections by the OECD, based on pledges 
made up to 2016, show that annual public 
financial resources would total 67 billion 
USD in 2020 if they are not ratcheted up. In 
Bonn there were no further commitments 
to fill the Green Climate Fund, which is the 
UN fund with a mandate to channel finan-
cial resources for climate projects. How-
ever, some progress was seen with respect 
to the Adaptation Fund. In recent years, it 
has been continuously short of funding and 
the initial source, a small charge per emis-
sions certificate traded under the Clean 
Development Mechanism, has already faded 
and will end in 2020. New market mecha-
nisms (Article 6, Paris Agreement), which 
could qualify as a source, are not yet es-
tablished under the Paris Agreement. At 
COP23, Germany pledged 50 million EUR, 
Sweden, Italy, the Walloon Region and 
Ireland joined in with another 30 million 
EUR. With an approximate amount of 93 
million USD in resource mobilization, the 
initial goal for 2017 of 80 million USD was 
exceeded. However, these are pledges that 
still need to be delivered on. 
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More ambit for the UNFCCC agenda 
At COP23, after six years of an impasse in 
negotiations, a decision was finally taken 
on how to deal with climate change in both 
agriculture and food security. Parties are 
now required to submit their reports on 
climate action in agriculture, adaptation 
assessment methods for improving soil 
health, soil carbon and soil quality as well 
as considerations for improving nutrient 
use and manure management; and re-
porting on socio-economic and food secu-
rity dimensions. A stocktake is planned for 
COP26 in 2020. 
Another issue is recognizing the role 
and empowerment of women in climate 
actions. This agenda was already included 
in the Lima work programme in 2014 and 
COP23 arrived at the adoption of a Gender 
Action Plan. It includes sixteen activities to 
build capacity and improve the participa-
tion of women in climate negotiations and 
actions in the work plan. Also, a new plat-
form to include local communities and 
indigenous peoples’ voices in the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreement has been 
operationalized. The platform will under-
take activities to educate, build capacity 
and facilitate the incorporation of the 
diverse and traditional knowledge systems 
in international and national climate 
action policies. Full operationalization is 
planned for spring 2018 during the inter-
sessional meeting. 
Finally, the Fijian Presidency’s launch 
of an ocean initiative was a big success for 
the island state, as it establishes the crucial 
link between climate change and oceans. 
A work programme on the same is expected 
to be devised by 2019. 
The US at the Bonn climate talks 
The Bonn summit was the first UN climate 
meeting since US President Donald Trump 
announced the US’s withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement in June 2017. As the US 
announcement has no immediate legal 
bearings, with the actual withdrawal pro-
cess yet to begin, the US will be part of the 
negotiations until late 2020, coinciding 
with the next federal elections. Ahead of 
the COP, signals from Washington were 
mixed. On the one hand, the administra-
tion had announced its intention to re-
negotiate the terms of the Paris Agreement, 
especially in changing the US Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDC). On the 
other hand, it claimed to play a ‘construc-
tive’ role in Bonn. Accordingly, there was 
a high degree of uncertainty as to how the 
US delegation would contribute to the 
items on the agenda. 
Even though political resistance would 
have been an option for the negotiators and 
was anticipated by most of the Parties, it 
was business as usual for the delegates at 
the COP as far as the US was concerned. The 
US, for its part, forged ahead with its posi-
tion on the use of coal and fossil fuels, the 
delegation even held a side-event on the use 
of clean fossil fuels which was met with 
heavy protest from civil society. It also indi-
cated its intention to re-join the Paris Agree-
ment under conducive circumstances bene-
ficial for the US economy, also reflected in 
the US’s Statement during the High-Level 
Segment at the COP. However, delegates 
from various negotiating groups made it 
clear that re-negotiation was not an option. 
Going along with its established climate 
stance, the US continued to block negotia-
tions on the inclusion of pre-2020 actions 
in the COP Agenda, finance discussions and 
equity in components of accounting, stock-
take, adaptation and loss and damage. 
While on transparency issues the US, to-
gether with China, worked towards formu-
lating rules pronouncing the importance 
of data. 
New momentum was created by the US 
non-state actors’ alliance that presented 
itself in Bonn and had set up a pavilion 
outside the official negotiation zone. The 
“We are still in” initiative comprises US 
states, companies, mayors and NGOs, 
demonstrating their commitment to up-
holding climate action despite the US fed-
eral government’s anti-climate approach. 
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Who will lead on international 
climate policy? 
The idea of leadership in international 
climate policy is not a fully defined and 
commonly shared concept. Leadership can 
be expressed as a political concept, imple-
mented by targeted diplomacy. Also, leader-
ship can evolve by undertaking climate 
actions and delivering on targets. As a best-
case scenario, these two types of leadership 
go hand in hand. For solving a global chal-
lenge of such large a dimension as climate 
change, a single country’s leadership, while 
being necessary to stimulate others, is by 
no means sufficient. Cooperation amongst 
the players needs to be part of the diplo-
matic leadership. 
In light of the US turnaround in 2017, it 
is not clear who will be in the driving seat 
during the next years of UN climate nego-
tiations. Until the 2016 elections in the US, 
the Obama administration was the most 
significant driver behind the Paris Agree-
ment, together with the EU. The EU, how-
ever, has a long-standing tradition of 
supporting multilateral climate policy 
measures and negotiations and a successful 
record of climate diplomacy, while the US 
has been a difficult actor and obstructionist 
in implementing meaningful progress on 
climate issues in the past. The active en-
gagement in the negotiations coupled with 
significant domestic climate policies under 
president Obama was rather the exception 
than the rule, but it also left its mark do-
mestically as the “We are still in” coalition 
demonstrates. 
China has still to deliver on its claim 
of leadership 
The Chinese government announced a 
strong leadership role in international cli-
mate policy back in January 2017, after 
the US elections. In the course of the year, 
when the US was openly pondering a with-
drawal from the Paris Agreement, China 
joined the EU and Canada in claiming to 
have built a new coalition for driving the 
Paris Agreement forward. The Chinese 
government, however, sees the leadership 
narrative grounded in delivering on cli-
mate action and quickly moving to a low 
carbon economy. At the COP23, it was 
obvious that China continues to have com-
mon position with developing countries, 
such as the group of Like Minded Develop-
ing Countries (LMDC) and G-77, demanding 
finance for the Adaptation Fund and for 
the overall 100 billion USD commitment 
to international climate finance post-2020 
under the Paris Agreement. This clearly 
falls behind the stance China held when 
the Paris Agreement was negotiated and 
Beijing offered 3 billion USD for climate 
finance under the South-South climate co-
operation fund and thus intended to join 
the group of donor countries. 
India 
Unlike China, India has not made any 
public statement pledging leadership on 
climate change issues. Rather, New Delhi 
has welcomed the proposed EU-China 
partnership on climate change and has 
emphasized the role of developing coun-
tries in any concrete response to climate 
change cooperation. 
Moreover, while the EU has spoken 
openly about collaborating with China 
on furthering climate action, it has been 
rather quite about engagement with India 
on climate change. At the 14th India-EU 
Summit that concluded in October 2017 
in New Delhi, the two countries merely 
confirmed their commitment to climate 
change targets, whereas the platform as 
such provided more political space for a 
concrete proposal or pathway on how to 
proceed with the climate change agenda in 
a constructive way that is also balanced. 
Moreover, at the Bonn COP, India, with a 
view towards the EU, stressed the need 
for adopting sustainable lifestyle and con-
sumption patterns without offering a clari-
fication of the concepts. Over the years, 
the EU-India bilateral dialogue has been 
marred by logjams on trade agreements. 
The resumption of the dialogue in 2016 
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provided new hope for the bilateral relation 
to realize its full potential, especially in 
areas of climate change and energy. The 
Joint Statement and Agenda for Action 
2020, adopted in 2016, has a separate and 
detailed section on climate change, but pro-
gress still needs to happen on that front. 
From an EU point of view, India is too im-
portant to be ignored in climate policies 
and the EU aims to achieve more meaning-
ful cooperation through intensified talks 
with India. Yet, in diplomatic circles, the 
EU has refrained from using the word 
‘leadership’ in any political statement on 
climate change in relation to India. 
Even though India intends to play an 
active and relevant role, it does not seem to 
be equipped diplomatically to climb into 
the driver’s seat on international climate 
change policy. The Indian side is seen as 
more focused on procedural issues at the 
UN climate talks, and showcasing its do-
mestic achievements towards 2020 targets 
with energy and climate policy initiatives 
largely hinging on solar power generation 
and increasing energy efficiency. 
EU facing a new dimension of 
climate leadership 
The EU was the unilateral leader in the 
climate regime during the early Kyoto 
Period (1997 – 2005) and up to the Copen-
hagen summit in 2009. Thereafter, the EU’s 
role as an international actor has weak-
ened. The financial crises, the rise of popu-
lism and not least the 2016 Brexit referen-
dum decision by the UK led to a decreasing 
impetus of the EU at international level. 
Nevertheless, during the creation of the 
Paris Agreement, the EU was a bridge 
builder and facilitator. The EU has varying 
diplomatic skills and tools at its disposal. 
A pool of well-capacitated political leaders 
comprising the European Commission, 
the incoming Presidency, a Directorate for 
climate action and agencies such as Exter-
nal Action Service gives the EU a range of 
political resources and diplomatic capa-
bilities. This is unique among any other 
actor in international affairs. 
In 2017, the EU attempted to close ranks 
internationally to safeguard the Paris 
Agreement against political erosion, e.g. 
with China and Canada at the Petersburg 
Dialogue meeting in May. In relation to 
China, it is unclear how this could now be 
successfully implemented as both the EU 
and China are very different actors and 
while the EU has been successful on soft 
issues including human rights, justice and 
environment, China’s record in this sphere 
has not been laudable. 
EU failed as a bridge builder 
At the same time, the EU found it difficult 
to deliver on particular issues of impor-
tance to the international process, as seen 
in Bonn. For example, it sided with the 
US in blocking the inclusion of pre-2020 
actions in the COP Agenda and on proce-
dural matters of the global stocktake, new 
market mechanisms, loss and damage and 
adaptation. During the negotiations, the 
EU was unable to drive constructive discus-
sions in Bonn, while the debate on the issue 
of equity in such discussions failed to be 
resolved. This is due to at least two reasons. 
First, the EU cannot initiate more climate 
action in the short term. It takes a long 
time to draft legal proposals and to pass 
them. Its 2020 targets were decided back 
in 2008 and the 2030 targets are currently 
subject to the legal process. The EU was 
very late to deliver on its ratification of the 
Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, 
which it submitted on 21st December 2017. 
Secondly, the efforts of European negotia-
tors to reflect equity in the light of new 
emerging realities were strongly resisted by 
countries including China and India, who 
continue to refuse this narrative that shifts 
some responsibilities for increasing climate 
efforts to emerging economies. They inter-
pret equity under the Paris Agreement in 
the traditional sense of differentiated re-
sponsibility, as enshrined in the UNFCCC. 
The Paris Agreement includes the obliga-
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tion that developed countries must make 
key contributions to emission cuts and that 
the provision of finance to developing coun-
tries in their efforts to move to low-carbon 
scenario, but it also opens up some avenues 
for emerging countries to engage on a vol-
untary basis. It became obvious in Bonn 
that China is not ready to follow through 
on the leadership intentions it signalled 
earlier in 2017, although since 2014, it had 
stated this intention when teaming up 
with the US during preparations for a new 
Agreement. 
Externally, the assertive climate stances 
by China, India or the Island states, which 
have assumed more relevance since the 
Copenhagen Summit in 2009, imply that 
leadership is getting more complex to orga-
nize. Thus, the spirit of the Bonn talks also 
places demands on new climate alliances 
the EU commits to. 
The next COP will be in Poland and 
offers another opportunity for the EU to 
demonstrate commitment to global negoti-
ations. Since Poland is not amongst the pro-
gressive EU member countries, but rather 
has been a bottleneck in promoting climate 
action, high demands will be placed on the 
European Commission, who will have to 
balance the interests of not only its external 
partners, but also those within the EU it-
self. The progressive EU Member States 
want to accomplish implementation of the 
Agreement with the rulebook, emissions 
reductions and other processes. In partic-
ular, French president Macron has assumed 
an active role in pushing for more interna-
tional action on climate change and fi-
nance. He hosted the One Planet Summit 
on 12th December 2017 to raise climate 
finance to meet the goals of the Paris Agree-
ment. However, while private finance 
took centre stage with new initiatives 
announced, a lack of commitments from 
public finance, especially in the case of 
adaptation finance persisted. The French 
government did not offer any significant 
plan on raising ambitions either. Therefore, 
while at present France is clearly pushing 
for more action, this alone will not suffice 
to fill the leadership void. 
Moving forward 
Climate negotiations in 2018 face a set of 
pressing issues that will need to be ad-
dressed by the EU and its partners. Up until 
the COP24 in Poland, pressure will mount 
to finish the Paris Agreement rulebook and 
to deliver on finance and on more climate 
action in the short term, pre-2020. More-
over, the UN process will need to include 
an increasing number of non-state actors 
and issues, extending the sphere of climate 
diplomacy. 
As discussions in Bonn were not con-
structive on more equity in procedural as 
well as agenda items and the usual familiar 
rhetoric and divide was witnessed, it is high 
time a concept of equity is consensually 
operationalized. To this end, the Talanoa 
Dialogue will be an opportunity to set the 
stage and to guide the exchanges that are 
needed for the rulebook into a direction 
that is acceptable for developing countries. 
In particular, India’s engagement is crucial 
as it has been an ardent advocator of equity 
for a long time. 
For the EU along with China and India, 
fulfilment of 2020 climate commitments 
seems to be an already done deal. More 
climate actions with regard to pre-2020 
can, therefore, only materialize through EU 
Member States. Some of them, including 
France, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, 
Italy, Portugal and Austria, have already 
committed themselves to addressing the 
phase-out of coal power production and 
joined a global initiative called Powering 
Past Coal Alliance, led by the UK and Cana-
da. However, Germany is not on board. The 
European Commission could become more 
pro-active on this by initiating a post-2020, 
long-term plan for phasing out coal inter-
nally as well as a move to support the new 
alliance. 
Prospects of increasing the 2030 climate 
target are very limited as legal procedures 
are still underway to implement the 40 per-
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cent target offered as the EU NDC under the 
Paris Agreement. The target is weak and 
will not suffice to lay the ground for 
meeting the mid-century emissions reduc-
tion target of up to 95 percent. This situa-
tion constitutes a challenge that would 
need to be addressed by revising the 2050 
Climate and Energy Roadmap and re-
thinking the traditional approach to cli-
mate targets (see Geden 2017, SWP Com-
ments 2017/C 48). 
Significantly, climate finance is an area 
where the EU can demonstrate leadership. 
In 2016, the EU and its Member States con-
tributed 20.2 billion EUR, mostly through 
loans for largely mitigation-related actions 
to middle income economies. This needs 
to be updated with a view to revisiting the 
nature of finance, along with focussing on 
adaptation finance and supporting the 
resilience of vulnerable countries. 
Another field for the EU is to follow up 
changing the consumption patterns in 
order to achieve climate targets – the need 
for which it has repeatedly identified. This 
could also contribute to international 
exchanges on how lifestyles can be made 
compatible with the overall constraints on 
emissions needed at the global level. For 
the time being, there is no clarity as to 
whether and when the US would return to 
a constructive role in international climate 
policy and under whose Presidency that 
might happen. Yet, dealing with the US 
remains strategically important for the EU. 
Within this context, empowering the pro-
climate alliances at different levels of 
governance and engaging with non-state 
actors addressing climate protection, in 
the US as well as globally, must be an inte-
gral part of the climate diplomacy of the 
EU and its Member States. 
Considering that the state of the climate 
negotiations is in flux, the EU is still the 
most relevant actor in the international 
climate process with its past successes and 
reliable follow-up on new regulations. In 
the current sensitive state of Paris Agree-
ment implementation, the EU’s directional 
and instrumental guidance is highly impor-
tant, also in view of the urgency of ad-
dressing climate change. But instead of 
merely aiming to revive the “leading-by-
example” narrative, the EU and its Member 
States should also invest in intensifying 
partnerships with key countries and other 
actors who support the model of the Paris 
Agreement climate regime. 
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